Ledger.com briefly served malicious JavaScript after attackers exploited the signup flow of Optimizely Web Experimentation, a third-party service used by Ledger and many other organisations. Ledger says the code has been removed and the incident did not compromise its hardware-wallet security architecture. The important distinction is that a secure device can still be paired with an untrusted browser session, so users must verify every destination address on the device itself before approving a transaction.
Key takeaways
- The incident originated in Optimizely Web Experimentation, not in Ledger firmware or a Ledger Secure Element.
- Attackers impersonated users through a vulnerability in Optimizely's account-signup flow and injected JavaScript into some customer projects.
- Optimizely says the first malicious code was written on 16 November 2026 at 07:51 UTC; it closed the vulnerability at 16:10 UTC and removed injected code from affected projects by 22:24 UTC.
- Researchers linked the campaign to snippets used by 178 organisations, but the behaviour and exposure varied by site, device and browser.
- Ledger says private keys remained protected by the hardware wallet. It has not publicly disclosed a Ledger-specific count of affected visits or confirmed losses.
- A hardware wallet cannot prevent a user from approving an attacker-controlled address that is clearly shown on its own screen.
What happened
On 16 November 2026, an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in the account-signup flow of Optimizely Web Experimentation. According to Optimizely's incident report, the attacker could impersonate legitimate users and add malicious JavaScript to the Project JavaScript area of selected customer projects.
This was not described as a takeover of an Optimizely administrator account, and Optimizely says it found no evidence that customer passwords were exposed or used. The company says only Web Experimentation was affected; Feature Experimentation, SDKs and the legacy Full Stack product were not involved.
The first malicious code was written at 07:51 UTC. Optimizely detected the activity at 13:34 UTC, closed the vulnerable path at 16:10 UTC and finished removing the injected code from affected projects at 22:24 UTC. Ledger Donjon later confirmed that Ledger.com had been among the affected websites and that the malicious code was no longer being served.
This was a web supply-chain incident. The route ran through a third-party experimentation script loaded by the website. It was not a reported compromise of Ledger device firmware, the Secure Element or the private keys stored inside a Ledger.
How a third-party script reached Ledger.com
Web experimentation services let companies test layouts, messages and user journeys without rebuilding an entire site for each variation. To do this, the website loads a JavaScript snippet managed through the service provider. That script has legitimate permission to change what a visitor sees in the browser.
The same convenience creates a shared trust dependency. If an attacker can alter the centrally managed script, the customer's own domain may deliver the unwanted code from infrastructure that the browser already treats as legitimate. The website's TLS certificate can still be valid, and the address bar can still show the correct domain.
Independent researchers reported malicious snippets connected to 178 organisations. That number describes the broader Optimizely campaign, not a confirmed count of Ledger customers, visits or losses.
What the malicious code could do
Security researchers observed different payload paths depending on the website, browser and device. Reported capabilities across the wider campaign included replacing copied cryptocurrency addresses, collecting payment-card fields, stealing cookies or screenshots, and directing some iPhone or iPad visitors toward an exploit chain.
Those findings describe the campaign as a whole. They do not prove that every payload ran on Ledger.com or that every visitor received the same code. Ledger has not published a site-specific breakdown of sessions, browser combinations, information collected or confirmed financial losses.
| Confirmed | Not publicly confirmed |
|---|---|
| Ledger.com served malicious code through affected Optimizely infrastructure | How many Ledger visitors received or executed it |
| Ledger and Optimizely removed the code and closed the affected path | Whether card details or session data were taken specifically from Ledger visitors |
| The Ledger device security architecture was not affected | Any Ledger-attributable loss caused by this incident |
Why Ledger devices and private keys remained secure
A Ledger hardware wallet keeps private keys inside the device and signs transactions only after the user approves them. JavaScript running in a browser cannot simply read those keys from the Secure Element. Ledger therefore says private keys remained protected by the device.
That protection has a boundary: the device proves what it is being asked to sign, not whether the recipient is trustworthy. If malicious code changes a copied destination address and the user confirms the altered address shown on the Ledger screen, the device will correctly sign the wrong transaction.
The Ledger screen is the final source of truth. Compare the complete destination address and transaction details on the device itself. Do not rely on the browser, clipboard, phone or computer display.
Where users could still be exposed
The practical risk depends on what a visitor did during the affected window. Simply owning a Ledger does not make the wallet compromised. Exposure is more plausible if the visitor copied a cryptocurrency address, initiated a transaction, entered payment-card information, stayed signed in to a sensitive account or used an unpatched mobile browser while the malicious script was active.
A completed on-chain transaction cannot be recalled merely because the address was replaced. By contrast, a payment card can usually be monitored, blocked or replaced through the issuing bank. Browser sessions and account passwords should be reviewed independently from wallet keys.
What users should do now
- Review transaction history around 16 November. Check the receiving address and amount on a block explorer or in Ledger Wallet. Investigate any transaction you do not recognise.
- Check card activity. If payment-card details were entered on Ledger.com during the incident window, monitor the account and contact the card issuer if anything is unfamiliar.
- Update the browser and operating system. This is especially important for iPhone and iPad users because researchers reported a mobile exploit path in the wider campaign.
- Sign out of sensitive web accounts and invalidate suspicious sessions. Change a password where there is evidence of account misuse, and protect the account with a hardware security key where supported.
- Verify every address on the hardware wallet. Read the full address on the device before approving, not only the first and last characters.
- Never enter the recovery phrase into a website. Ledger, SIAMBC and genuine support staff will never ask for it.
There is no reason to move assets or create a new recovery phrase solely because a user visited Ledger.com. A new wallet is necessary if the recovery phrase was entered into a website, shared with another person or otherwise exposed. In that situation, create a completely new seed on a trusted device and move the assets promptly.
What this means for SIAMBC customers
The public notice concerns Ledger.com and the Optimizely service used on that site. It does not identify SIAMBC as an affected website or distribution channel. The incident does not alter the hardware integrity of genuine, factory-sealed Ledger devices supplied by SIAMBC.
Customers who need help reviewing a suspicious transaction or confirming the correct setup route can contact SIAMBC. Do not send a recovery phrase, private key, PIN or passphrase; none of those secrets is required for support.
FAQ
Was Ledger.com hacked?
Ledger.com served malicious code because attackers exploited a third-party Optimizely Web Experimentation workflow. The confirmed route was through the external script supply chain, not a reported takeover of Ledger hardware or firmware.
Can the code steal a private key from a Ledger device?
Ledger says the device security architecture was unaffected and private keys remained protected. Browser code cannot directly extract a key from the Secure Element, but it may try to trick a user into approving the wrong destination.
Should every Ledger owner reset the wallet?
No. A reset or new seed is not required merely because of this web incident. It becomes necessary if the recovery phrase itself was disclosed or entered into an untrusted website or app.
Does a valid website address mean the page is safe?
Not always. A compromised third-party script can run on a legitimate domain with a valid HTTPS connection. That is why transaction details must be checked on the hardware wallet, which is outside the browser.
What if an address was copied but no transaction was approved?
No blockchain transfer occurs until a transaction is signed and broadcast. Close the session, reopen trusted software, obtain a fresh address and verify it on the device before trying again.
Information current to 18 November 2026. The investigation may evolve as Ledger, Optimizely and security researchers publish additional verified details. Educational information only; not financial or legal advice.





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